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IN THE UTAH COURT OF APPEALS 
DALE H. MORGAN, 
Plaintiff and Appellee, 
vs. 
BARBARA A. MORGAN, EVA S. BARNEY 
BARNEY and VALLEY BANK & TRUST 
COMPANY, a Utah corporation; each 
of the above-named defendants per-
sonally, if living, the unknown 
spouse, heirs, devisees, assignees, 
personal representatives, and all 
creditors of each of the deceased 
defendants; also all other persons 
unknown claiming any right, title, 
estate, interest or lien upon the 
real property described in the 
Complaint adverse to plaintiff's 
ownership or clouding plaintiff's 
title thereto, 
Defendants and Appellants. 
Barbara A. Morgan, defendant and appellant (hereinafter 
"defendant"), hereby replies to the Brief of Appellee, Dale H. 
Morgan, (hereinafter "plaintiff") as follows: 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I. THE SUMMARY JUDGMENT APPEALED FROM IS NOT A 
FINAL JUDGMENT, AND THEREFORE THIS APPEAL IS PREMATURE. 
Plaintiff does not discuss defendant's arguments (as 
made in her original brief) under this same point, except to say 
in effect that the judgment is final because the court signed the 
Summary Judgment after defendant had filed her objections under 
REPLY BRIEF 
OF APPELLANT 
Case No. 920846 
Priority No. 16 
Rule 4-504(2) of the Code of Judicial Administration. The 
plaintiff states in his brief at page 11: 
"Clearly, this action on the part of the trial court 
constitutes a denial of the defendant's objection to the 
proposed order. Therefore, this appeal is from a final 
order." (Emphasis added.) 
If this result is "clear" to the plaintiff, then perhaps he will 
allow that it should also be "clear" to the defendant, and if it 
is "clear" to the defendant that this appeal is from a final 
judgment, it is hard to understand how (if the court on appeal 
should find that it is not a final judgment) defendant can be 
accused of filing the appeal "knowing it to be premature, and not 
from a final judgment," and that therefore defendant should be 
saddled with attorney's fees. Plaintiff fails to explain how it 
can be clear to plaintiff that it is a final judgment, but that 
defendant must know that it is premature. 
The interaction between said Rule 4-504(2) and Rule 4 of 
Utah Rules of Appellate Procedure is not crystal clear. In Tolboe 
Const, v. Staker Paving & Const., 682 P2d 843 (Utah 1984), the 
ruling of the court appears to mean that an objection under Rule 
4-504(2) tolls the time in which to appeal until the objection is 
specifically ruled on. In Tolboe the court signed the judgment 
before the objection thereto was made, and that also appears to be 
the case in Calfo v. D.C. Stewart Co., 717 P2d 697 (Utah 1986); 
Wayne Garff Constr. Co. v. Richards, 706 P2d 1065 (Utah 1985) ; 
Larsen v. Larsen 674 P2d 116, (Utah 1983); and Bigelow v. 
Inqersoll, 618 P2d 50 (Utah 1980). 
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When the court signs an order without expressly noting 
that the court is thereby overruling any such objection, the 
litigant is literally left in the dark as to where he stands with 
respect to the necessity of appealing within thirty days. Any 
prudent attorney is not going to risk losing his client's lawsuit 
because he makes the wrong decision on that point. Furthermore, 
as noted in defendant's original brief, in Note 4 of the case of 
Workman v. Nagle Const. Inc., 802 P2d 749 (Utah App. 1990), casts 
doubt on the continued validity of Tolboe and its companion cases. 
In times gone by, the District Courts had regular law 
and motion calendars, and a litigant could get on a calendar 
rather rapidly. If we had such a procedure at the present time, a 
litigant could get before the court for clarification within the 
thirty-day period, but where litigants do not have ready access to 
law and motion calendars, they are normally required to wait until 
the court gets around to their written submissions, and that is 
frequently not accomplished within the thirty-day deadline 
involved in appeals. 
In short, it was defendant's view that the objection 
stayed the appeal time, but because of the risk to the defendant, 
defendant's counsel did not feel that they could rely on that view 
because of the possibility that plaintiff's view (that the 
judgment is final) might be accepted by the court. 
POINT II. A COTENANT CANNOT DEAL WITH THE COMMON 
PPROPERTY IN A MANNER ADVERSE TO THE INTERESTS OF HIS OR HER 
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COTENANTS, AND ACTIONS BY ONE COTENANT TO PRESERVE THE PROPERTY 
INURE AS A MATTER OF LAW TO THE BENEFIT OF ALL OF THE COTENANTS. 
Plaintiff attempts to circumvent defendant's arguments 
regarding this point as made in her orginal brief on two alleged 
grounds: (1) that plaintiff and defendant "were not cotenants of 
the property in issue at any time relevant to these proceedings," 
and (2) that this case does not involve "adverse possession." 
With respect to whether or not the parties were 
cotenants, plaintiff's position fails to take into consideration 
that parties do not have to both hold legal title in order to be 
cotenants, but that a party holding a legal title and one holding 
an equitable title can also be cotenants. In this action 
plaintiff brought suit alleging that the legal title to the 
property was in the defendant, but that plaintiff was entitled to 
have the court declare that he was a one-half owner of the 
property. In other words, plaintiff was alleging that defendant 
was an undivided one-half owner of the property in equity by 
virtue of a constructive trust and was asking the court to convert 
that equitable interest to a legal interest through a recordable 
decree of the court. If the plaintiff did not have an equitable 
interest in the property, he did not have a lawsuit. In his 
deposition plaintiff maintained the same position as set forth in 
his Complaint, claiming therein that he had a right to one-half of 
the proceeds from both parcels. (See plaintiff's deposition, 
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pages 23-27, R. 261-265, copies of which are attached hereto in 
the Appendix,) 
In 20 Am Jur 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, 
Section lf "cotenancy" is defined as follows: 
"The term fcotenancy' refers to the ownership of 
property by two or more persons in such manner that they 
have an undivided possession or right to possession, but 
several freeholds, and thus defined it includes joint 
tenancies, tenancies in common, and estates by the 
entirety." (Emphasis added.) 
Estates by the entirety are generally obsolete and can 
be disregarded for purposes of this case. Joint tenacies require 
the four unities of time, title, interest and possession. All 
other cotenancies then are tenancies in common. That is what we 
have in the present case. It was unequivocally plaintiff's 
position that he was entitled to ownership of an undivided one-
half interest in the subject summer home (and the Salt Lake City 
residence). He did not claim that he was entitled to the north 
half of the property, and the defendant the south half, or the 
like. He did not claim even that the parties should be joint 
tenants with one another because obviously after the divorce 
neither party was interested in having any right of survivorship 
held by the other. Plaintiff clearly asserted that he was already 
a tenant in common with the defendant in equity and sought to have 
the court establish that relationship with respect to the full 
legal title through a decree of the court. 
Let us note this example: If two persons hold a 
property as cotenants (whether as tenants in common or joint 
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tenants), they have a joint right to possession. This is so cjjhere 
they hold legal titlef and it is also true where they hold 
equitable title as when both are purchasing under contract. In a 
case where two persons hold legal title, if one of the parties 
sells his half-interest to a third party on a uniform real estate 
contract, can there be any question that the purchaser of the one-
half interest is a cotenant with the owner of the other half-
interest, and that they (the new buyer and the owner who is not 
selling) have a joint right of possession to the property? (The 
seller of said one-half interest loses his right to possession and 
holds "legal" title to said one-half interest as security only.) 
We read in 77 Am Jur 2df Vendor and Purchaser, Sec. 317: 
"A contract for the sale of land operates as an 
equitable conversion; the vendee's interest under the 
contract becomes realty and the vendor's interest under 
the contract constitutes personalty. In equity the 
purchaser is regarded as the owner subject to liability 
for the unpaid price and the vendor as holding the legal 
title in trust for him from the time a valid agreement for 
the purchase of land is entered into. This view of the 
estate of the purchaser is based on the maxim that 'equity 
regards and treats as done whatf in good conscience, ought 
to be done.' Accordingly, in equity a contract for the 
sale of land is treated, for most purposes, precisely as 
if it had been specifically performed. Thus, as a vendee 
makes payments on a land contract the vendor becomes 
trustee for him of the legal estate, and he becomes in 
equity the owner of the land to the extent of payments 
made. A contract for the sale of land, part of the 
purchase price being paid and possession taken, vests 
in the vendee an equitable title in fee." 
If plaintiff is entitled to have the court adjudge that 
he has an interest in the summer home, then in equity this is 
taken as having already been done, and he is a cotenant with the 
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defendant from the beginning. It will hardly do to allow 
plaintiff to now say in effect, "Please forget that I ever filed 
this lawsuit as I have made other arrangements, and it is now 
inconvenient for me for the court to note that I have been asking 
in this action to be adjudged to be a legal owner of the summer 
home." Plaintiff's position that the plaintiff and defendant were 
not cotenants simply is not sustainable. 
With respect to the matter of adverse possession, 
perhaps only this needs to be stated: It is true that this case 
does not involve adverse possession, but most cases illustrating 
the fiduciary relationship between cotenants arise in the adverse 
possession context. Defendant does not assert, nor is the law of 
fiduciary responsibility between cotenants limited to, adverse 
possession cases. 
20 Am Jur 2d, Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, Section 71, 
states in part: 
"In accordance with the general principle that 
adversary title acquired by a cotenant inures to the 
benefit of his cotenants, the rule in most states is 
that where property owned in common is sold at a 
judicial sale or pursuant to a power contained in a deed 
of trust for the purpose of satisfying an obligation 
which rests alike upon all of the coproprietors, none of 
them can purchase the estate for his sole benefit. . . 
" . . . And where the cotenancy property is purchased on 
foreclosure by the creditor who in turn conveys to one 
of the cotenants, the transaction is nothing more than 
the removal of an encumbrance so far as the cotenants 
are concerned, and the general rule applies." 
See in support Hardin v. Counsel, 200 Ga 822, 
38 SE 2d 549 (1946). 
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The author further points out in said Section 71 that 
even where a stranger purchases the title at the judicial sale, if 
there is collusion, the general rule applies and the purchase is 
held to be for the benefit of all cotenants. It is not really 
necessary to get into the matter of collusion because in this case 
plaintiff claims that the judgment creditor purchased the property 
at the alleged sheriff's sale (assuming that the sale was valid, 
which the defendant contests), but in any event even if the sale 
were valid, the judgment creditor purchased the property at 
sherifffs sale, subsequently conveyed it to plaintiff and, 
according to the general rule, such acquisition by plaintiff will 
inure to the benefit of both plaintiff and defendant, subject only 
to defendant's reimbursing plaintiff, which defendant is, and at 
all times has been, willing to do. Said Section 71 also states 
that the general rule (that acquisition by one cotenant inures to 
the benefit of all cotenants) "will likewise apply where, although 
purchase by a third person intervenes, the substantial effect of 
the latter's conveyance to one of the cotenants is, at least as 
between the cotenants, a redemption from the foreclosure sale." 
This is certainly the effect here where plaintiff pays 
approximately $6,000 for a $165,000 summer home. 
POINT III. A FACT ISSUE EXISTS AS TO WHETHER OR NOT 
PLAINTIFF AND PINE MEADOWS ASSOCIATION WERE IN COLLUSION IN 
CONDUCTING THE SHERIFF'S SALE. 
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As noted above, it is not really necessary for defendant 
to establish collusion under existing law because the conveyance 
by Pine Meadows to plaintiff inures to the benefit of defendant, 
his cotenant, in any event. In addition, it is clear that action 
by plaintiff in collusion with Pine Meadows to deprive defendant 
of her legitimate interest in the property is invalid. 
Plaintiff's only response to this point is that defendant did not 
take action to set aside or otherwise stay the execution sale. 
The answer to that of course is that defendant did not know 
anything about the execution sale since she was never served with 
summons. The execution sale only came to light in this lawsuit. 
Even plaintiff acknowledges this fact when he says at page 17, " . 
. . defendant herein has known about the Circuit Court action and 
judgment since at least early 1992 . . . " In her original brief 
defendant has indicated that she intends to set aside that 
judgment, if necessary, but since the purchase inures to the 
benefit of the defendant, that action may be unnecessary, although 
it may be advisable if plaintiff and defendant do not in fact owe 
any money to the plaintiff as originally claimed by plaintiff. 
The defendant was initially led to believe by the plaintiff that 
no amounts were owing to the homeowners1 association. If that is 
so, then of course plaintiff and defendant jointly should seek 
relief against Pine Meadows. If, in fact, some amount is owing, 
and defendant has been misled by plaintiff in that regard, then it 
would not appear to be necessary or prudent for defendant to 
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undertake such action inasmuch as the property has been redeemed 
by plaintiff for the benefit of both defendant and plaintiff. As 
noted above, defendant has tendered to plaintiff her share of such 
redemption, being one-half of the redemption price of $6,000. It 
would not stretch the imagination to note that she could easily 
incur attorney's fees and costs far in excess of that sum in 
seeking to set aside the Circuit Court judgment and subsequently 
trying the Circuit Court case. 
Plaintiff further asserts that there is no issue of 
collusion because the parties do not have an obligation one to the 
other with respect to the subject property. As noted in Point II 
above, that is simply not the law. 
Plaintiff states at page 21 of his brief: 
"Assuming for the sake of argument that Mr. Morgan 
and the homeowner's association did in fact collude to 
'launder' the title to the summer home, and simultaneously 
to pay the fees owing to the homeowner's association, then 
defendant cannot describe one reason why such action on 
the part of the plaintiff was illegal or improper." 
In Point II above defendant clearly cites good reason 
why that action was illegal and improper, and on summary judgment 
all facts and inferences must be construed in favor of defendant. 
This is particularly so where plaintiff's motion was not supported 
by any kind of an affidavit, and therefore defendant was not even 
required to file a counteraffidavit, but nevertheless requested of 
the court, before it ruled on the Motion for Summary Judgment, 
that she be given additional time in which to explore the issue of 
collusion. It was not really essential to defendant's case that 
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further discovery take place on collusion because the case was not 
ripe for summary judgment in any event due to the lack of any kind 
of an affidavit filed by plaintiff in support of his Motion for 
Summary Judgment. If plaintiff fails to file an affidavit in 
connection with summary judgment, defendant is not required to do 
so, and the court cannot go beyond the pleadings for purposes of 
summary judgment. 
POINT IV. THE PURPORTED FORECLOSURE IN THE CIRCUIT 
COURT OF SUMMIT COUNTY ESTABLISHES NO BASIS IN THIS ACTION TO 
QUIET TITLE TO THE SUMMER HOME IN PLAINTIFF. 
The foregoing is so because, as noted in Point II above: 
1. The parties were cotenants, and the action of the 
plaintiff in purchasing the title from the "judgment creditor" 
insures to the benefit of both parties. See 20 Am Jur 2d, 
Cotenancy and Joint Ownership, 71, cited above, and Hardin v. 
Counsel, supra. 
2. Defendant was not served with summons in that 
action, and the court therefore had no jurisdiction over her. 
3. The Circuit Court judgment was not a final judgment 
in that the issues relating to the plaintiff were not yet disposed 
of and, since it was not a final judgment, it was not subject to 
foreclosure sale. By definition, execution can only be levied 
based on a "judgment," (Rule 69, Utah Rules of Civil Procedure) 
and "judgment" as used in said Rule 69 means, in accordance with 
Rule 54(a), URCP, a judgment "from which an appeal lies," in other 
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words a final judgment. Under Rule 54(b), URCPf anything less 
than a final judgment is still subject to being modified by the 
court at any time. The so-called judgment against defendant in 
the Circuit Court case was not final and was not subject to being 
appealed or subject to having execution issued thereon. 
Plaintiff's only defense to the foregoing is that 
defendant should attack the Circuit Court judgment in that court. 
The fact of the matter isf however, that defendant asserts the 
outcome of that proceeding in this court to justify the court's 
decreeing title in him, whereas the "judgment" thus asserted in 
this court (by the plaintiff himself) is on its face invalid, and 
this court is certainly obliged to note that and to refuse to give 
credence to a judgment of an inferior court of this state, which 
on its face is insufficient and invalid to sustain plaintiff's 
claims regarding it because of lack of jurisdiction and lack of 
finality. 
POINT V. DEFENDANT'S CLAIMS AGAINST PLAINTIFF UNDER 
THE DECREE OF DIVORCE (IN THIS CONSOLIDATED ACTION) FOR ARREARS OF 
MORTGAGE PAYMENTS, BACK TAXES, ARREARS OF INSURANCE, REPAIRS TO 
THE RESIDENCE AND ARREARS OF CHILD SUPPORT TOTALING APPROXIMATELY 
$49,590 WERE NOT SUBJECT TO DISMISSAL OR OTHER RESOLUTION ON 
PLAINTIFF'S MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT. 
In response to this point plaintiff asserts in substance 
in subparagraph A at page 24 of his brief that the court was 
justified in dismissing defendant's Counterclaim because defendant 
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did not file an affidavit in opposition to plaintiff's Motion for 
Summary Judgment, that her "supplemental affidavit" was not 
timely, and that the court was in effect justified in ignoring the 
same. 
The fallacy with this argument is that the plaintiff 
does not even deal with the subject of "arrears" in his summary 
judgment, and further defendant was not required to file an 
affidavit at all because plaintiff had not filed an affidavit on 
this point, and defendant was entitled to rely on the pleadings. 
The fact that the defendant filed a supplemental affidavit in no 
way changes the foregoing, but was only intended to emphasize to 
the court that there were substantial and unresolved factual 
issues existing. 
In addition to the foregoing, in subparagraph B at page 
25, the plaintiff appears to be asserting that the court could 
rely on the deposition of the defendant and on the plaintiff's 
Request for Admissions to justify dismissal of the Counterclaim. 
Here again plaintiff's argument is in error because the Request 
for Admissions merely required the defendant admit or deny that 
defendant had no documents (other than those attached to said 
Request) relating to roof repairs, listing the Salt Lake home, 
real property taxes, mortgage payments and other repairs. The 
defendant did not have more documents, and therefore that Request 
for Admission had to be admitted, but this does not preclude 
defendant from claiming under the documents that were attached and 
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also from establishing by oral testimony that the alleged amounts 
sued for were indeed due to here. (Normally documents are not 
available to prove that some amount was not paid. They are 
usually only available to show that something was paid.) 
Furthermoref the Requests don't even deal with the subject of 
arrears of child support. The defendant was entitled to her day 
in court on those issuesf and was entitled to have the fact finder 
pass upon her oral testimony. The same is true with respect to the 
depositions. There is no statement is defendant's deposition 
which is inconsistent with, or which in any way precludes her 
Counterclaim for arrears of mortgage payments, taxes, insurance, 
repairs and child support, and plaintiff refers us to no such 
passages in the depositions. The same is true with respect to 
plaintiff's deposition, and in fact plaintiff admits in his 
deposition that he has no evidence to dispute defendant's claims 
regarding arrears of taxes, reroofing charge and insurance. He 
further admits that he did not make child support payments. (See 
plaintiff's deposition, pages 45-46, R. 283-4. Copies of said 
pages are attached to this brief in the Appendix.) 
The final "defense" to this point asserted by plaintiff 
is set forth in his subparagraph C at page 25 wherein he asserts 
that the trial court might be justified in paying an arrears of 
child support by means of a property settlement. It is true that 
the defendant has not asserted any authority in support of her 
position that such an offset would normally be improper, but it 
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appears logical. The child support is ordered for the benefit of 
the children so that their daily needs for food, clothing and 
shelter can be supplied, and it appears that it would be a rare 
situation where the court would be justified in allowing that 
obligation to be paid by means of a property settlement offset. 
It is a point that defendant made in her original brief, and we 
believe it to be generally a valid one, but it is certainly not 
crucial because in any event, even if the court undertook to do 
such a thing, the court would be required to make findings of fact 
setting forth the fact that the court had done it and setting out 
upon what basis it did so. The court has made no such findings, 
nor would it appear that the court could do so on a motion for 
summary judgment where the court is not sitting as a fact finder. 
POINT VI. THERE IS NO INDEPENDENT BASIS FOR THE TRIAL 
COURT'S RULING. 
At Point 6 of his brief plaintiff appears to suggest 
that even if the court were otherwise in error, the court could 
have dismissed this case for failure to prosecute. 
We respectfully submit that that is totally erroneous 
and would not in any event be a basis for granting summary 
judgment. 
It is within the power of either party to move a case 
along. The plaintiff cannot complain that the case does not move 
fast enough, because it is entirely within his power to move it 
along as fast as he wants to. The plaintiff initiated this 
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actionf and it would appear that if either party should bear the 
greater burden of moving the case along, it would be the one who 
started it. 
Furthermore, it is clear from the court's ruling (see 
Minute Entry in the Addendum to defendant's initial brief herein) 
that the plaintiff's Motion for Summary Judgment was based solely 
on what the court perceived as a "factual differentiation in this 
case and the cases cited by the defendant and in particular 
Heiselt v. Heiselt the court is of the opinion that the general 
rule which as stated therein does not apply herein. Therefore, 
the plaintiff's motion is well taken." (See Minute Entry in 
appendix to appellant's initial brief herein.) 
The sole basis for the court's ruling was the court's 
belief that the law regarding the fidiciary duty of cotenants was 
not applicable to this case. To try to stretch that express 
determination into a dismissal by the court of the claims of both 
parties for failure to prosecute is totally unsupportable. 
POINT VII. IT WOULD BE ERROR FOR THE COURT TO CONSIDER 
THE TRIAL COURT ORDER OF SUMMARY JUDGMENT AS AN ORDER CONSISTING 
OF MULTIPLE PARTS. 
There is no basis for bifurcating the summary judgment 
as suggested by plaintiff. It is in error in its entirety. 
At Point 7 of plaintiff's brief, he appears to be 
asserting that even if the court finds error with regard to the 
court's determination that defendant's Counterclaim regarding 
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various arrears should be dismissed, that the court should still 
leave standing that portion of the summary judgment awarding 
plaintiff the summer home. The plaintiff also appears to suggest 
that if this court finds that the trial court made an error in 
awarding the defendant the Salt Lake County home, that he has no 
objection to having that matter sent back for trial on that issue. 
There is no basis for the foregoing suggestions. 
First of all, defendant has shown adequate grounds for 
setting aside the summary judgment with regard to the summer home. 
Furthermore, if the rulings regarding the house and/or 
defendant's Counterclaim for various arrears need to be reversed, 
then the judgment under Rule 54(b) cannot be a final one, the 
entire matter has to be sent back, and any portion of the judgment 
would in any event remain subject to being modified by the court 
below at any time. 
Finally, the only basis upon which the court could have 
awarded the summer home to the plaintiff would have to be because 
the court awarded equivalent property to the defendant, and any 
such issue would have to be based on findings by the trial court 
after a factual hearing. This Honorable Court does not have 
before it sufficient facts to resolve the equities between the 
respective parties, and a full plenary trial will be necessary to 
establish such facts. 
-17-
CONCLUSION 
For the foregoing reasons, and those set forth in 
defendant's initial brief, the Summary Judgment and Order of the 
trial court is in error and should be reversed in its entirety and 
the matter remanded to the trial court for trial on the merits 
with respect to all issues and all parties. 
ORAL ARGUMENT 
Appellant respectfully requests oral argument on this 
appeal. 
DATED the >? day of March, 1993. 
Respectfully submitted, 
GORDON A. MADSEN 
ROBERT C. CUMMINGS 
Attorney for Appellant 
CERTIFICATE OF SERVICE 
Four copies of the foregoing Reply Brief of Appellant 
were "tftarttrsd to Mary C. Corporon, attorney for appellee, at her 
address, 310 South Main Street, Suite 1400, Salt Lake City, Utah 
84101, penrtragg- prepaid, the ^7 day of March, 1992. 
Attorney for Appellant «&J-—-> 
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APPENDIX 
Deposition of Dale H. Morgan 
Pages 23 - 27 
Pages 45 - 46 
23 
A I seen it sometime back. I don't know if it was 
the time it was filed. 
Q Calling your attention to paragraph 8 — well, 
excuse me, paragraph 6, you allege in your complaint that in 
September or October of 1984 defendant Barbara Morgan 
contacted you and you were then living outside the state. 
Where were you then living? 
A I think it was Arkansas. 
Q And she advised you, you claim, that she had 
purchasers for both parcels of real property? 
A That's true. 
Q You say she was the one that called you? 
A Yes. 
Q You didn't contact her? 
A I contacted her several times. 
Q But with regard to this conversation? 
A You're getting technical. I don't remember. 
There was several conversations. 
Q In any event, I take it this was by phone? 
A That's correct. 
Q And in that phone conversation she claimed to 
have buyers for both parcels; is that correct? 
A One or two. I don't remember. She said she had 
prospective buyers. 
Q Tell me the whole contents of that conversation 
DEPOSITION OF DALE H. MORGAN 0026J 
to the best 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
A 
buyers. 
Q 
A 
Q 
_ _ 
you can. 
I can't remember that conversation. 
Any of it? 
Yeah, I can give you the essence of it. 
That's what I'm asking you to do. 
I just did. I said she said she had prospective 
Is that all she said? 
Well, there was many other things that was said. 
What else do you remember about that 
conversation? 
A 
Q 
A 
Q 
I don't remember. 
Did you discuss the price, for example? 
No, I didn't that I can recall. 
Did you discuss any kind of terms of what was 
being offered or anything of the kind? 
A 
remember. 
Q 
You're asking me something that I can't 
You tell me you don't remember, but I'm asking 
you the particulars of that conversation. First of all, the 
property was listed, was it not, by you? Both parcels were 
listed with real estate agents? 
A 
that time. 
Q 
I don't remember whether it was or wasn't at 
Did you ever have the property listed? 
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Q 
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Q 
A 
Q 
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by a real 
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Yes. 
To whom or with whom? 
I don't recall. 
Do you know for what time period? 
No, I do not. 
Do you know whether or not the buyer that you 
discussed in this conversation had been produced 
estate agent that you had retained or not? 
I don't know if I retained him. I just said I 
do not know. 
Q 
party? 
A 
yes, not 
Q 
listed wi 
A 
Q 
discussed 
You also just said you did retain some listing 
You asked if it had ever been listed and I said 
this particular time. 
Well, do you know that, whether it was or wasn't 
th your agent at this particular time? 
No, I do not know. 
My question then was, was there anything 
to suggest that it was your listing agent or not 
who produced the would be buyer, if you know? 
A 
Q 
And I said I do not know. 
Now was there anything at all discussed about 
what proceeds you were to receive out of this would be sale? 
A 
know all 
At my understanding at the time, and I do not 
the discussion, was that all the proceeds just like 
00263 
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1 we had agreed to in this would be divided equally, 
2 Q You didn't ask what those proceeds would be? 
3 A How do I know? I do not know what the offer 
4 was, if there was, in fact, an offer. 
5 Q You didn't explore that actual in this 
6 conversation? 
7 A No. 
8 Q It didn't matter to you who the buyer was, what 
9 the potential price would be, what proceeds would be coming 
10 from it to you or otherwise; is that what you're saying? 
11 A No, because I knew whatever it was would be 
12 divided equally. I'm sure that if she had one she's not 
13 going to give it away. 
14 Q And any other other — well, specifically do you 
15 remember these parts of that same conversation, do you 
16 remember telling Barbara that you wanted the property out of 
17 your name because of the woman you were then living with who 
18 was getting your assets? Do you recall any such 
19 conversation along that line? 
20 A No, no, none. 
21 Q That you're saying you do remember that that 
22 didn't happen? 
23 A Yes, I say that did not happen. 
24 Q While you can't remember otherwise what did 
25 happen, you're sure that didn't? 
ouye-i 
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A I am positive that did not happen, 
Q And did you also indicate to her in that 
conversation that by giving her the deeds to the property 
you were absolving yourself from further responsibilities in 
the way of debts, payments, roofs or anything else in the 
way of liabilities, that you were walking away from it? 
A No. 
Q You're sure that conversation didn't occur? 
A I am positive of it. 
Q And is it your recollection that — pardon me, 
if I were to say Barbara's recollection is that you were the 
one that initiated this conversation, you earlier said you 
don't remember who initiated it, one or the other of you did 
but you're not now sure? 
A That's right. 
Q Who prepared the quit claim deed that you make 
reference to in your complaint? 
(Exhibit No. 6 & 7 marked for identification.) 
Q (BY MR. MADSEN) I hand you what's been marked 
Deposition Exhibit 6 and 7. 
A I prepared it. 
Q You had the legal description? 
A Yes. 
Q And you f i l l e d that in? 
A Yes. 
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Q Take the time to read it now, because I'm going 
to be asking you some questions about it. 
MS. CORPORON: Just the counterclaim portion? 
MR- MADSEN: The counterclaim portion. 
Q (BY MR. MADSEN) Have you read it, Mr. Morgan? 
A Don't say as I understand it but I read it. 
Q You note in there that Barbara Morgan indicates 
tax payments she had made on the properties. Do you recall 
reading that? 
A Yes, I read that. 
Q Do you have any evidence to dispute that she 
made those tax payments? 
A I don't know. 
Q Do you have any evidence — she alleges in there 
that she paid for the roofing of the home. 
A No, I do not know. 
Q You don't know and have no evidence — I should 
probably have told you that your counsel filed a general 
denial in her reply to those allegations which means they're 
at issue. I'm now saying what evidence do you have, if any, 
to disprove those particular amounts of claims? Do you see 
what I'm getting at? 
A Yes, I understand. 
Q I began with the taxes. Do you have any 
evidence to dispute the payments that she alleges she made? 
00283 
A 
Q 
she made 
A, 
° 
she made 
A 
Q 
^ ^ , _
 4 6 
NO* 
Do you have any evidence to dispute the payments 
on the reroofing? 
No. 
Do you have any evidence to dispute the payments 
for insurance? 
No. 
And you've already indicated while you dispute 
the children needed support you have made no payment of 
support money as per the requirements; is that correct? 
A 
When you 
made any 
That's correct. Well, let's stop right there. 
say I never made any payments, I said I have not 
payments to her, but the children lived with me 
until September of '83. 
Q 
position. 
A 
Q 
Of course that's disputable, but that's your 1 
That's fine* That's my position. 
Your position is that's why you didn't make 
them, but you made none; is that correct? 
A 
Q 
That's correct. 
Now again getting the conversations, let me 
suggest one other area and if you have a memory about it, 
fine, if you don't I'll understand, but do you recall having 
any conversations during this four year period with Barbara 
in which you wanted to borrow money and use the property as 
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